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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1969

-

IS IT A MEANS OR AN END?*
By ERWIN N. GRISWOLD**
I.
While I was preparing for this lecture, I received from former
colleagues of mine two new casebooks. One of these, by Lloyd L.
Weinreb, is a very interesting and imaginative treatment of the substantive problems of criminal law. It presents these questions from a
fresh point of view, in 578 not too tightly filled pages.
The other book came from Professor Livingston Hall, also of the
Harvard Law School. It has been prepared by him and three other
law school teachers. This is the third edition of their Modern Criminal
Procedure. It is a remarkable, and literally a weighty volume. I put
it on the scales, and it weighs nearly six pounds. It occupies 1,456 twocolumned pages. Clearly, there is a great deal which can be learned by
the current generation of law school students about criminal procedure.
This contrast between the two books may well serve as my theme
for this lecture. The book on criminal procedure is about three times
as long as the book on criminal law.
When I was in law school, I took a course on criminal law, and
learned quite a bit about assault and battery, murder, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny and embezzlement, and something about various
sorts of statutory crimes. As far as I can recall, there was no course
on criminal procedure, although we did take up some matters about
the administration of the criminal law in courses on constitutional
law and evidence.
Now, I gather, there is not too much to be learned about criminal
law. But there is a vast amount to be learned about criminal procedure, as is shown by the new book to which I have referred. This
is really a very fascinating volume. It has a large amount of material,
mostly from decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and many thoughtful discussions of this material, and many questions for the consideration of the students who will use it. In some
ways, in its intricacy and detail, it reminds me of a casebook on taxation, or on bankruptcy. The field with which it deals clearly includes
* This Article was delivered as the third annual Morris Ames Soper Lecture
at the University of Maryland School of Law on October 28, 1969.
** Solicitor General of the United States; A.B., M.A., 1925, Oberlin College;
LL.B., 1928; S.J.D., 1929, Harvard Law School.
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one of the growing points of the law. Students are very fortunate
to have so comprehensive and thoughtful a guide in entering this
burgeoning area.
But, is procedure an end in itself, or is it a means to another end,
the enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of justice?
Before going further, let me make it plain that I do not think that
there is any clear and simple answer to the question I have just put.
I am well aware of the fact that sound administration of the criminal
law cannot be carried out except through procedures properly developed
and applied. Like all questions worth asking in the law, this one is
one of degree. We cannot have criminal law without criminal procedure; and criminal procedure without criminal law would be a waste
of time. The problem is to find the proper balance. It is not an easy
task, either to locate and define, or to administer and carry out.
In thinking about this problem, I recalled an observation of a
scholar of the criminal law: "Indeed, the more refined and persistent
becomes the analytic, juristic examination of its elements, the greater
is the danger that the utilitarian function of the criminal law will be
lost sight of and be replaced by a kind of intellectual game of chess."'
This passage was later quoted by Sir John Barry, Judge of the
Supreme Court of Victoria in his introduction to a book by Morris
and Howard called Studies in Criminal Lazw2 and he made some
observations there, from his own experience, about the plight of a
trial judge. With us, the plight of the trial judge is real, too. I would
add that with us the plight of counsel, both the prosecutor and defense
counsel, is even greater than it is in the British countries where these
two books appeared. If they are to do their jobs right, they must
master a 1500 page, two-columned book on criminal procedure, and
keep up, almost on a day-to-day basis, with current developments in
the Supreme Court, as well.
In connection with my present work, I have ample opportunity
to observe one facet of the administration of the federal criminal law.
In preparation for this lecture, I reviewed all of the cases which were
filed in the Supreme Court in forma pauperis during the October Term
1968, which closed last June. There were 504 of these cases on the
Court's Miscellaneous Docket. Before going further, let me make it
plain that I do not regard the review of these cases as having any
statistical validity. I have made no effort to include the criminal cases
on the Court's regular docket. There are some of these, but not a
great many. Examination of the criminal cases on the Miscellaneous
Docket does cover a very high proportion of the criminal cases which
come to the Supreme Court seeking review. They at least show the
type of issues which are raised. It may be, too, that the Chief Justice's
law clerk and I are the only persons who read all the briefs for the
government in these cases. I can at least say that they serve as the
basis for my own observation and experience, which is really the
subject matter of my talk today.
1. L. RADZINOWICZ, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINOLOGY 181 (1962).
2. N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STuDsS IN CRIMINAL LAW XXVII (1964).
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II.
Of the 504 Miscellaneous cases in the October Term 1968, to
which the United States was a party, fifty-eight were civil cases of
one sort or another. This left 443 criminal cases. Of these, there
were nine in which it is not possible to tell the nature of the charge.
This leaves 434 cases, which are the subject of my comments.
The cases may first be divided by the type of crime involved.
The most striking fact is that eighty-three out of these 434 cases, or
nearly twenty per cent, involved bank robbery. There were also ten
cases of post office robbery. Thus, the total of these two types of
serious robbery is well over twenty per cent of the whole number.
Here, I may make a parenthetical observation. If there is one crime
where the defendants are relentlessly pursued, usually caught and
convicted, and where they receive long sentences, it is bank and post
office robbery. Yet, there seems to be a never-ending supply of persons who engage in this sort of activity. In this area, at least, it is
not clear that vigorous law enforcement acts as an effective deterrent.
The other large category is that of narcotics. There were eightyone cases involving prosecutions for sale of heroin, and other narcotics,
such as morphine and cocaine. There were fourteen cases involving
sales of marijuana. Turning to another problem, there were thirtynine cases under the Dyer Act, for interstate transportation of stolen
automobiles, and nineteen cases involving interstate transportation of
forged checks, money orders, or stolen securities. There were twentythree cases involving violation of the draft laws, fourteen cases of
counterfeiting, eleven cases of mail fraud, ten cases of kidnapping, and
six cases involving illegal liquor. There were also eighteen cases of
murder and eighteen cases of robbery, mostly in the District of
Columbia. There were three cases under the Mann Act. Beyond
these, there were some thirty categories involving one or two cases,
such as escape, false claims, reentry after deportation, putting explosives in the mail, misapplication of bank funds, and so on, down to
the charge in one case of making coarse utterances in a national park.
III.
Very little of significance can be obtained from these figures, I
think. However, there is another aspect of the cases which I find
striking. As I have indicated, there were 434 criminal cases, where
the nature of the charge can be ascertained from the papers. Of these,
however, only 308 were on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.
The balance, or 135 cases which went through a district court, then
through a court of appeals, and then to an effort to get into the
Supreme Court, involved some form of collateral attack on a previous
judgment of conviction. Thus, the number of cases involving collateral attacks - 135 - was forty-five per cent of the number of cases
involving direct appeals - 308. Of the 135 cases, 102 involved
motions to set aside a sentence under Section 2255 of Title 28 of
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the United States Code,3 which was enacted twenty-one years ago,
in 1948, while the remaining thirty-three cases involved efforts to
obtain other sorts of collateral relief, such as habeas corpus, writs of
error coram nobis, complaints about failures to receive a transcript,
motions for new trial on newly discovered evidence, mandamus to
remove notations from record, motions for release because of improper
computation of the term of sentence, motion to dismiss an indictment,
suits against government agents for violation of rights, mandamus to
obtain a special diet, and so on.
The 102 cases in which criminal defendants knocked on the door
of the Supreme Court under Section 2255 may be further broken
down as follows:
In seventy-four of these cases, this was apparently the first application made to the Court for post-conviction relief. However, there
were fourteen cases in which this was the second application; in seven
cases it was the third application; and there were three cases in which
it was the fourth application, three in which it was the fifth application, and one in which it was the sixth application. Of the thirty-three
cases raising questions of post-conviction relief through an application
for habeas corpus or mandamus, or other relief, one was the second
such application, and one was the fourth application.
Of course, these cases in the Supreme Court are simply the top
of the iceberg. They represent only a small portion of the total number of cases which are brought into the federal courts seeking postconviction relief under Section 2255 or through some other procedure.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts advises me
that there were in the United States courts of appeals, 670 such applications from federal prisoners in the year ended June 30, 1969. This
compares with 485 such applications in the previous year. The largest
number, of course, is in the district courts. There were 3,612 petitions
by federal prisoners in the federal district courts in the year ended
June 30, 1969; and this figure is to be compared with 2,851 such
applications in the previous year. It is clear that the number of these
applications is large and that it is increasing.
In this connection, I may say that I am dealing here only with
applications by federal prisoners. The number of applications to the
federal courts by state prisoners is nearly three times that of the
federal prisoners. The total figure for all such applications, from state
and federal prisoners combined, for the year ended June 30, 1969,
was 12,924. This is about a fifteen per cent increase over the total
figure of 11,152 for the previous year.4
One thing is very clear from these figures. This is that the
prisoners in penitentiaries have come to take their places among the
largest law schools in the nation, and "jailhouse lawyers" are doing
a very large business.5 Whenever the Supreme Court of the United
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948).
4. The figures, covering collateral review of both state and federal courts, in
both the courts of appeals and the United States district courts are set forth in note 8,
infra. These were compiled by and furnished through the courtesy of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

5. CI. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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States hands down a significant decision in the criminal law area, my
office receives a large number of requests for copies of the opinion.
These are often followed by requests for copies of cases cited in the
opinion, and so on. A number of our prisons have built up substantial
law libraries. Whether this is good penology or not, I do not know.
There is another incidental aspect of these applications to which
reference may be made. This is the fact that the application under
2255 must be made in the court where the sentence was imposed.6
Thus, if a man is sentenced in New York and sent to Atlanta, his
application under Section 2255 is filed in New York. One of his hopes
is that, at the very least, he will get a trip out of it. This possibility of
seeing the outside is a considerable lure 7 and may well account for the
filing of a considerable number of these petitions - along with the fact
that the preparation of the petitions occupies some of the time which
is available to those who are spending their days behind prison walls.8
6. Id.
7. "One of the gains to the [post conviction] applicant in seeking relief, even if
he loses on the merits, is a day or more 'on the outside,' a fact that has not escaped
the attention of the courts." A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 69 (1967), quoted in
L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVp & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1315
(1969). See also United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 217 n.25 (1952).
8.

PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRIC' COURTS, FISCAL YEARS
1964 THROUGH 1969

Fiscal Years

_

Type of Petition
Total all petitions - -----

1964
6,240

1965
7,888

1966
8,540

1967
10,443

1968
11,152

1969
12,924

Petitions by federal prisoners-

2,098

2,559

2,292

2,639

2,851

3,612

U.S. Parole Board reviews--Motions to vacate sentence----

58
972

82
1,244

64
863

104
958

131
1,099

150
1,444

882
186
4,142
3,694
448

974
259
5,329
4,845
484

1,017
348
6,248
5,339
909

1,045
532
7,804
6,201
1,603

1,045
576
8,301
6,488
1,813

1,373
645
9,312
7,359
1,953

Habeas corpus
Other prisoner petitions----Petitions by state prisoners-Habeas corpus
Other prisoner petitions-

PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
FISCAL YEARS 1965 To 1969

Type of Petition
Total
Petitions by Federal prisoners--Motions to vacate sentence-Habeas corpus
Other prisoner petitions ---Petitions by State prisoners ---Habeas corpus
Other prisoner petitions----

1965
1,006
422
300
104
18
584
571
13
Source:

1966
1,094
382
248
104
30
712
668
44

1967
1,313
421
245
119
57
892
792
100

1968
1,720
485
313
105
67
1,235
1,069
166

1969
2,078
670
403
188
79
1,408
1,197
211

Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Washington, D.C., 20544 - October 13, 1969
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IV.
There is one matter of considerable importance which appears
from examination of the something over 400 federal criminal cases
appearing on the Supreme Court's Miscellaneous Docket during the
October Term 1968, ended last June. This is the fact that a very high
proportion -

not all by any means, but a very high proportion -

of

the questions raised were essentially procedural; that is, they did not
directly affect the question whether the defendant was guilty of the
crime charged. For example, there were forty-four cases in which
questions were raised with respect to illegal search and seizure, and
sixteen cases involving the question of illegal arrest. There were
thirty-six cases where there had been pleas of guilty, but efforts were
made to review the consequent judgment of conviction on the ground
that promises had been made to induce the guilty plea, or that it was
otherwise coerced, or that the defendant acted upon incompetent advice
of counsel. There were thirty-three other cases in which questions
were raised with respect to the effective assistance of counsel. There
were seventeen cases in which it was contended that the defendant
had been denied a speedy trial. There were twenty-seven cases in
which questions were raised because two or more defendants had been
tried together and it was contended that this was, in one way or
another, unfair. There were thirteen cases involving proceedings or
evidence before the grand jury, or efforts to gain access to grand jury
minutes. There were eight cases in which various questions were
raised because the defendant was tried by the federal authorities while
he was held by state authorities under another judgment, or where
he was tried by state authorities while he was subject to a federal
sentence. There were also seven cases where various questions were
raised with respect to the computation of sentence. There were three
cases where it was contended that there had been improper newspaper
publicity during the trial.
Turning to matters which might be regarded as involving both
substance and procedure, there were twenty-seven cases raising some
question with respect to identification of the defendant, such as the
use of photographs, lineups, or on-the-scene identification; and there
were eleven cases involving contentions of entrapment. There were
eleven cases involving questions of proper warning under the Miranda
decision.' There were two cases in which it was contended that the
government's closing argument was improper. There were four in
which it was contended that the government had knowingly used
perjured evidence, or had suborned perjury. There were two cases
where it was contended that improper material had been included in
the pre-sentence report considered by the judge, and one case where
it was contended that the jury was improperly influenced because they
had inadvertently seen the defendant in handcuffs when he was being
led through a corridor to the courtroom.
These are mentioned simply by way of illustration. I am merely
trying to give the flavor of the cases as one sees them going by in
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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a rather continuous stream. It is apparent, I think, that a very considerable amount of time and thought are expended in these cases on
matters which are essentially procedural rather than substantive. These
are matters which may go to the fairness and propriety of the trial
and I do not belittle them. To some observers, though, it may seem
that they not infrequently have little to do with the question of the
guilt or innocence of the defendant of the substantive crime charged.
V.
Let me now make some observations with respect to some aspects
of the consequences of two of the procedural developments of recent
years. In doing this, I am fully aware of, and wholly in accord with
the statement made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter a number of years ago
in McNabb v. United States10 where he said: "The history of liberty
has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards."
Like all questions in the law worth discussing, however, the
balance between substance and procedure is a question of degree. If
we make of procedure an intellectual chess game, we may lose sight
of the legitimate and necessary end of the criminal law. It is, of
course, equally true that if we ignore proper procedures we may make
the criminal law an instrument of tyranny. My own thought is that
we need not accept either of these extremes. The problem is to find
a proper balance.
A. Right to Counsel
The recognition of an effective right to counsel in criminal cases
was too long postponed. In the popular mind, this goes back to Gideon
v. Wainwright," decided in 1963. As far as criminal trials in the
federal courts are concerned, however, it was established in Johnson
v. Zerbst,12 decided in 1938, more than thirty years ago. There can
be no doubt that the presence of counsel has made a significant contribution to the administration of criminal justice. There can be no
doubt, either, that this belated innovation has introduced some new
problems. I will try to summarize some of these, though I do not
have the opportunity here to discuss them fully.
There has been a vast amount of devoted work by many lawyers
in representing indigent defendants in criminal cases. This is a burden,
in my opinion, which practicing lawyers should not be called upon to
carry at their own expense, except in unusual cases. More effective
provision should be made, both state and federal, for the representation of indigent defendants on a systematic basis.
In the last few years, there has been a great expansion of the
availability of lawyers through the Legal Aid agencies, and through
offices established under the Office of Economic Opportunity. There
is also the Criminal Justice Act,'" which is quite effective in many
10.
11.
12.
13.

318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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federal courts, and there has been some development and improvement
in state public defenders, or other organized defender agencies. However, some of this is transitory. We need to take further steps to see
that representation is provided for defendants in criminal cases on a
regularly established, systematic, and publicly financed basis.
Unfortunately, some lawyers are not as able as they might be,
and a few are not adequately conscientious. Others, though working
very hard, get involved in too many cases, and fail to make adequate
preparation, or take some step that might have been pursued. The
defendant is not merely entitled to counsel; he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. 4 If counsel undertakes the case, and then
neglects it, should the defendant be the one to suffer? This is a real
problem, though fortunately a relatively rare one. Perhaps bar associations should undertake a greater responsibility to admonish lawyers
who are careless, or to take more serious steps in cases warranting
that action.
Nevertheless, the fact that lawyers sometimes fail to do things that
they should or could do has a collateral consequence. It means that
no matter what a lawyer does, the defendant can always contend,
either directly, or in a collateral post-conviction proceeding that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel. What are some of the
results of this?
Because of the screening involved, both by the district attorney
and by the grand jury, I think it a fair statement to make, simply as
a factual matter, that a high proportion of persons who are charged
with serious crimes are in fact guilty. Indeed, the whole system for
the administration of criminal justice is built on that premise. We
have never had the facilities to conduct trials of all persons charged
with crime. The plea of guilty is normal, and is expected in a high
proportion of cases.
However, since all defendants now have counsel, the proportion
of pleas of guilty is considerably reduced. Many conscientious counsel
feel that there is nothing to be lost for their client by going to trial.
At the worst, he can be found guilty, and that only after considerable
delay. Moreover, trials being what they are, there is considerable
likelihood that there will be some error in the admission of evidence,
or in the charge, or somewhere along the way in the proceedings,
which will mean, at the very least, that there may be a new trial and
the final evil day can be still longer postponed.
Moreover, what happens if counsel, having conscientiously reviewed the evidence, does advise his client to plead guilty? Then,
there is a very considerable prospect that there will, in due course, be
an application for post-conviction review, based on the contention that
the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Let us suppose, though, that counsel does advise a not guilty plea.
There is then a trial, at which the defendant is convicted. Under our
system, it now becomes almost automatic that there should be an
appeal. Here, again, the failure to take this step may result in a con14. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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tention that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, if there is an appeal, and the judgment of conviction is
affirmed by the court of appeals, there is great pressure on counsel to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Again,
if he does not do this, the contention may be made that the defendant
was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
In this, our practice is in great contrast to the British system.
There, a question of appeal in a criminal case would be referred to
counsel, who would be a barrister. He might be privately retained, or
provided under the Legal Aid system. The barrister would review
the matter, and if he felt that there was no basis for an appeal, he
would say so. His professional reputation would be affected if he
appeared in court on a case quite without merit. As a result, a relatively small number of criminal cases are appealed in Great Britain.
With us, the tendency is all the other way. A lawyer's professional
reputation might be affected if he did not take an appeal. Moreover,
as a practical matter, he may have no effective choice. If he is assigned
to represent the defendant, he generally has no practicable alternative
except to go ahead and make what he can of such points as he thinks
he can find in the record.
No doubt, we would be unable to import into our system the
expertise and standing of the British barrister. It may well be, though,
that we could find some way to make it more professionally acceptable
to decline to proceed with an unwarranted appeal, and, going back to
the earlier stage, to make it more professionally acceptable to recommend a plea of guilty in appropriate cases. Where the defendant is
guilty, it may be in his interest to get the matter over with, and for
him to accept whatever sentence may be involved; in order that he
may sooner get his troubles behind him and be free to start out on
a new path.
Needless to say, nothing that I have said is intended in any way
to put any pressure on a lawyer to recommend a plea of guilty in any
case where it is his professional judgment that such a plea should not
be entered, or to refrain from taking an appeal where, in his professional judgment there is sound basis for an appeal. All I am trying
to suggest is that there should be a greater opportunity to exercise
such a professional judgment, and a willingness to exercise it.
B. Search and Seizure
One of the most important developments in criminal procedure
in recent years has been the reactivation of the fourth amendment
with respect to search and seizure. There can be no doubt that this
was long overdue, particularly in the field of state prosecutions. For
example, I quote the following from the New York Times of April
28, 1965:
"The Mapp case was a shock to us," Deputy Police Commissioner Leonard Reisman, head of the department's legal bureau,
said. "We had to reorganize our thinking, frankly. Before this
nobody bothered to take out search warrants.
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"Although the Constitution requires warrants in most cases,
the Supreme Court had ruled that evidence obtained without a
warrant - illegally if you will - was admissible in state courts.
So the feeling was, why bother ?""1
Similarly, Professor Yale Kamisar recorded the following statement from the Minneapolis Star :18 "Joseph A. Hadley, head of the city
attorney's criminal division from 1929 to 1954, said he could remember
only two search warrants issued in that period. The city attorney's
office has no record of any issued since 1954."
Surely, these practices were wrong. If the fourth amendment
means anything, there should be the determination of an independent
magistrate before a search is made. There should similarly be an independent determination before an arrest warrant is issued except in
cases where the arresting officer himself has probable cause. The
decisions of the Supreme Court ,which have emphasized and enforced
these basic rights are hardly subject to criticism.
Again, like all questions worth discussing in the law, there may
be matters of degree. To me, for example, there is a clear difference
between search of a home, on the one hand, and the search of an
automobile, on the other, a greater difference than is, I think, recognized in the cases. Similarly, there is, it seems to me, real room to
question how strong a case must be made in the affidavit seeking a
search warrant. It may be remembered that ordinarily these affidavits
are not prepared by lawyers, and it seems hard to feel that there is
any reason that they should be prepared by lawyers, or treated as if
they were. They are not pleadings. There should be no requirement
either in form, or as a practical matter, that the whole case should be
tried out in connection with the application for a search warrant.
Search warrants should not be a formality. We do not want a
situation where they are signed up in blank, and left in a pad on the
policeman's desk, as is sometimes said to be the case with subpoenas.
On the other hand, the requirement should not be too technical. Time
is often of the essence in these matters, and it is not feasible to prepare
a search warrant application as if for trial. Particularly in rural areas,
the magistrate may be far away, and not especially experienced in
these matters. Of course, probable cause should not be found on mere
assertion. On the other hand, perhaps it should be more clearly recognized that probable cause for a search warrant is something very
different from sustaining the burden of proof at a trial.
There is another problem in connection with searches and seizures,
when these are made in connection with an arrest. In the last Term,
the Supreme Court held in Chimel v. California7 that a search in
connection with a lawful arrest may extend to the arrestee's person
to discover and remove weapons, and to prevent the concealment of
evidence on his person, and may extend to the area within the im15. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1965, at 50, col. 1.
16. Kamisar, On The Tactics of the Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the
Courts, 49 CORNELL L. Rzv. 436, 441 (1964), citing, Minneapolis Evening Star,
Aug. 22, 1961, § 9A, col. 1.
17. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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mediate control of the person arrested, meaning the area from which
he might gain possession of a weapon or effect the destruction of evidence. Any further search, the Court held, required a search warrant.
Here there is a very real practical problem. Does the police
officer have any power to maintain the status quo while he, or a colleague of his, is taking the time necessary to draw up a sufficient
affidavit to support an application for a search warrant, and then
finding a magistrate, submitting the application to him, obtaining the
search warrant if it is issued, and then bringing it to the place where
the arrest was made. It seems inevitable that a minimum of several
hours will be required for this process, at the very best. Unless there
is some kind of a power to prevent removal of material from the
premises, or destruction of material during this time, the search warrant will almost inevitably be fruitless. Of course, if a search warrant
is refused, the officers should leave the premises. May they guard
the premises, and prevent egress and entry, and action within the
premises, while the search warrant is being obtained? We do not
know. There may well be room here, though, for a balance in determining the applicability of the fourth amendment. If a warrant is in
fact obtained in such a case before a search is made, can it be said
to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment if steps are taken
to preserve the status quo?
VI.
Our standards and requirements in criminal procedure have been
greatly improved in recent years. I conclude by pointing out an important consequence of this development which has, I think, so far
escaped general recognition. This is the great increase in the time
which is now required to handle the average criminal case, from its
beginning to its end, and the consequent increase in the manpower
needed to conduct all aspects of our criminal law administration. I am
not now talking about the overall elapsed time from arrest to conviction, though that is of great importance. What I am talking about is
the aggregate amount of time in manhours actually required to be
devoted to the consideration and handling of each case - not merely
courtroom time, but overall time actually devoted to the case by all
the personnel involved.
This starts with the police, or other law enforcement officers.
They must be more thoroughly instructed as to their duties, and
must understand the requirements of the Miranda warnings. They
must devote time to the preparation of affidavits for warrants of arrest,
or search warrants, often in consultation with an Assistant United
States Attorney, or other lawyer, thus requiring the time of both
police and lawyer. There is also the time involved in presenting the
application for a warrant and getting it and executing it, and there is
the time of the magistrate, who must study the application, and
exercise his judgment.
Then we come to the indictment, and eventually the trial. Because
the defendant has counsel, there are fewer pleas of guilty, more cases
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are tried, and trials, of course, take the time of many people. Before
the trial, however, there are now likely to be numerous pretrial
motions, for the suppression of evidence, for discovery of one sort
or another, and for the disclosure of statements taken by the government, and so on. Usually, these pretrial motions require a hearing
utilizing the time of the judge, of an Assistant United States Attorney, as well as of counsel for the defendant, and of officials in the
Clerk's office, and other employees. Perhaps most important - though
this is often overlooked, and may surprise you - one of the most
serious shortages is found in meeting the requirement of the attendance of a court reporter. Reporters are also generally required now
for grand jury proceedings. In many cases, qualified reporters may
be scarce, and considerable time may elapse before the reporter's
transcripts are completed, without which, further steps, such as an
appeal, cannot be advanced.
When the case comes to trial, many procedural questions are
often raised, requiring a considerable amount of time at the trial.
There may be examination and cross-examination about Miranda
warnings, for example. If two or more defendants are involved, or
if there is a question under the Bruton case,' 8 there may be the need
to have two or more trials, with consequent increase in the overall
manhours involved. Other illustrations could readily be given.
If there is a conviction, then there is likely to be an appeal requiring time of counsel on both sides, and time and consideration
from three judges. If the judgment is affirmed on appeal, there is
likely to be a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Even if the judgment is affirmed on appeal, and certiorari is
denied, there can be a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 9 And there may be a motion
2
for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1
In either case, there may be appeals from the denial of such motions,
and these may lead to petitions for certiorari, and further proceedings. 2
Then, if all appeals are ended unsuccessfully, there may be an
application under Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code
for relief on a broad class of grounds.2 2 Such motions may be repeated; and, as I have indicated, there may be appeals from the denial
of such motions, and further petitions for certiorari.
It is not possible to get an exact figure as to what all of this
means in the administration of the criminal law. Friends of mine
who deal directly in these matters tell me that it takes from two to
four times as much time in manhours now, overall, to handle the
average criminal case through all of the proceedings available, as it
18. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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21. United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 375
F.2d 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), motion for reduction of Sentence
denied, (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922,
rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 994 (1969), second motion for new trial denied, (S.D.N.Y.
1969), appeal pending in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, is a striking example,
both as to the type of question, and the numerous hearings involved.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
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did ten years ago. These estimates seem to me to be on the outside,
one way or the other. I think a fair statement would be that it now
takes, on the average, three times as much active consideration time
to handle the average criminal case in the federal courts from beginning to end now as it did when we operated on a more rigid and
less refined procedure.
Let me point out what this means. It means about three times
as much judicial time for each criminal case, overall. Here is a considerable reason for congestion in the federal courts. Beyond that, it
means about three times as much time of the Assistant United States
Attorneys. This is a further reason for congestion in the federal
courts. In some situations, a judge is available, but there simply is
not an Assistant United States Attorney who has had time to prepare a case for trial. There has been a great increase in the number
of appeals, and thus a great increase in the demands on the time of
counsel and of the judges of the United States courts of appeals. And
there are hundreds of these cases, as I have indicated, which come
before the Supreme Court. A really troublesome aspect of the problem is with respect to court reporters. A good court reporter is a
member of a highly skilled occupation. In many cases, it is necessary
to wait for a reporter, and it may be very difficult to get prompt
transcripts of court proceedings. This problem is the cause of considerable delay in the administration of the criminal law.
VII.
The points I have suggested are intended to be illustrative only,
and in no sense exhaustive. They do show, I think, that improvements in our criminal procedure bring some problems in their wake,
which should be more clearly recognized. In discussing some of these
problems, I have had two things in mind. My first objective has
been to point out the inevitable cost of these developments, not in
money, but in time and manpower - the time not only of judges,
and lawyers on both sides, and clerks, but also of court reporters,
and other personnel. This means that we need many more, people
simply to handle the same number of cases as were handled before.
I believe that steps should be taken to increase our resources in manpower for the handling of these cases.
My second observation, in conclusion, is that in moving ahead
we should keep in mind the risk that problems of criminal procedure
may take on the guise of "a kind of intellectual game of chess." We
should not only remember the objective of procedure in the sound
administration of the criminal law itself, but we should constantly
recognize that nearly all questions of procedure, particularly those
with constitutional overtones, involve questions of balance and degree.
Like all good things in the law, they should not be pushed to a dryly
logical extreme. Criminal procedure, like criminal law, should be a
matter of substance and not of form. When the proper balance is
obtained, perhaps the casebooks on criminal procedure will not be
three times as long as those on criminal law.

